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NOTE
ASSESSING DIVISIBILITY IN THE ARMED
CAREER CRIMINAL ACT
Ted Koehler*
When courts analyze whether a defendant's prior conviction qualifies as
a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act's "residual
clause," they use a "categorical approach," looking only to the statutory
language of the prior offense, rather than the facts disclosed by the rec-
ord of conviction. But when a defendant is convicted under a "divisible"
statute, which encompasses a broader range of conduct, only some of
which would qualify as a predicate offense, courts may employ the
"modified categorical approach." This approach allows courts to view
additional documents to determine whether the jury convicted the de-
fendant of the Armed Career Criminal Act-qualifying part of the
statute. This Note identifies a split among the circuit courts regarding
when a statute is divisible. Under the "formal method," a statute is di-
visible only when its text specifies qualifying and nonqualifying
categories of conduct. By contrast, courts that employ the "functional
method" divide a statute if regardless of the statute's text, it is possible
to violate the statute in a way that amounts to a "violent felony" and in a
way that does not amount to a "violent felony." This Note contends that
the text-based 'formal method" is more consistent with the Supreme
Court's Armed Career Criminal Act jurisprudence, the Sixth Amendment,
and the rule of lenity. Finally, it argues that the "formal method" gives
Congress the strongest incentive to revise the vague and confusing
Armed Career Criminal Act.
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INTRODUCTION
More than two decades after its passage, the Armed Career Criminal Act
("ACCA") remains a nagging source of confusion and frustration. The stat-
ute mandates a fifteen-year minimum sentence for a felon who is convicted
of possessing a firearm and who has three or more previous convictions for
a "violent felony"' or "crime of violence." 2 It is used to increase the sen-
tences of hundreds of criminal defendants per year.3 In addition to four
1. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
2. Although the statute uses the phrase "violent felony," many cases and articles
interpreting the ACCA use the phrase "crime of violence" to refer to a predicate offense. I use
these two terms interchangeably in this Note.
3. E.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 47 tbl.22 (2008) (finding that in the 2008 fiscal year, federal courts applied 653
ACCA sentencing enhancements).
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specifically enumerated crimes-burglary, arson, extortion, and the use of
explosives-the ACCA includes as a "violent felony" any crime that "oth-
erwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another."4 This provision is known as the "residual clause."
This broadly worded "residual clause" has attracted substantial attention
from the Supreme Court, which has labored to interpret the ACCA five
times in as many years and has produced an inconsistent patchwork of deci-
sions.5 The Justices themselves have described the ACCA's residual clause
as "nearly impossible to apply consistently. '6 This difficulty has caused nu-
merous splits among the circuit courts, "the resolution of which could
occupy [the Supreme Court] for years. '7 The Court's own efforts to resolve
the splits have fared no better, having been criticized as "piecemeal, sus-
penseful, [and] Scrabble-like."8 Nor has Congress escaped the critical eye.
One Justice labeled the ACCA a "drafting failure,"9 and at least two Justices
have urged Congress to rewrite the statute from square one.10
Much of the difficulty that the courts have faced stems from their
attempts to navigate the two approaches to applying the ACCA's residual
clause: the "categorical approach" and the "modified categorical approach."
When a court considers an ACCA residual-clause case, it typically employs
the categorical approach, in which it looks only at the fact that a defendant
was convicted of a particular offense and not at how the defendant actually
committed the crime." The court then asks whether the conduct encompassed
by the elements of the offense presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.' 2 But when the statute the defendant violated includes
multiple categories of conduct, some of which could amount to a crime of
violence and some of which could not, the court may use the "modified
categorical approach." Under this approach, the court may consult a
limited set of documents to determine whether the jury convicted the
defendant of (or whether the defendant pleaded to) violating the part of the
statute that would constitute a "violent felony."'13 These two approaches are
well-established parts of the ACCA inquiry. But there is substantially less
agreement about when to move from the categorical approach to the
modified categorical approach.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
5. See infra Section I.B.
6. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 133 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment).
7. Id.
8. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 150 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
9. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 230 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. See, e.g., id.; Chambers, 555 U.S. at 132 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (in-
sisting that "only Congress can rescue the federal courts from the mire into which ACCA's
draftsmanship... [has] pushed us").
11. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,600 (1990).
12. See id. at 601-02.
13. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).
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Whether a court employs the modified categorical approach turns on its
assessment of whether a statute is "divisible." A statute is divisible if it con-
tains multiple categories of offense conduct, such that a court may "divide"
the statute into separate categories for the purpose of deciding whether the
defendant's prior conviction will be counted as a predicate offense. One
group of courts uses what I label the "formal method,"'4 which treats a stat-
ute as divisible only if the statute's text articulates multiple categories of
conduct."5 A second group uses the "functional method," which divides the
statute if the crime for which the defendant was convicted could, as a practi-
cal matter, be committed in multiple ways, regardless of the statute's text.'
6
The classification of a prior conviction-the fifteen-year mandatory mini-
mum sentence resulting from the application of the enhancement-may turn
on which method the sentencing court employs. Yet courts and commenta-
tors have not recognized the existence of the two methods and the uneven
application of the residual clause that results from their use. 7
This Note argues that sentencing courts should utilize the modified cate-
gorical approach only when appropriate under the formal method. In other
words, the modified categorical approach should be used only when the text
of the relevant statute specifies multiple categories of conduct, of which on-
ly some would qualify as a "crime of violence" under the ACCA's residual
clause. Part I explains the legislative history and recent Supreme Court ju-
risprudence surrounding the ACCA. Part II describes the categorical and
modified categorical approaches to analyzing predicate offenses. Part III
details the circuit courts' formal and functional methods of assessing divisi-
14. "Formal" and "functional" are my own ways of describing the different methods
of divisibility. These terms are not used by sentencing courts.
15. E.g., United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 406 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that a
divisible statute is one that "expressly identifies several ways in which a violation may oc-
cur").
16. E.g., United States v. Parks, 620 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that
"over-inclusiveness for career offender purposes may arise even if a criminal statute ... is not
textually divisible").
17. The majority of the ACCA scholarship focuses on which crimes should or should
not count as predicates, rather than on how courts actually analyze ACCA cases. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey C. Bright, Violent Felonies under The Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal
Act: Whether Carrying a Concealed Handgun Without a Permit Should Be Considered a Vio-
lent Felony, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 601, 618-36 (2010) (arguing that carrying a concealed weapon
is a "violent felony"); Jason Abbott, Note, The Use of Juvenile Adjudications under the Armed
Career Criminal Act, 85 B.U. L. REv. 263, 272-92 (2005) (arguing that judicial adjudications
are not "convictions" and should not be counted for ACCA purposes); Tracey A. Basler, Note,
Does "Any" Mean "All" or Does "Any" Mean "Some"? An Analysis of the "Any Court"
Ambiguity of the Armed Career Criminal Act and Whether Foreign Convictions Count as
Predicate Convictions, 37 NEw ENG. L. Rev. 147, 177-82 (2002) (arguing that foreign con-
victions should count as predicate offenses); Krystle Lamprecht, Comment, Formal,
Categorical, but Incomplete: The Need for a New Standard in Evaluating Prior Convictions
under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 98 J. CrM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1407, 1426-29 (2008)
(arguing that courts should not count recidivism enhancements in prior convictions when
assessing whether a prior conviction meets the ACCA's one-year minimum punishment re-
quirement for inclusion as a predicate).
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bility. Part IV argues that the formal method is more consistent with the cat-
egorical approach and the Supreme Court's ACCA jurisprudence. Part V
analogizes the formal and functional methods to the familiar "rule versus
standard" distinction and suggests that a formal, rule-based method is more
likely to avoid Sixth Amendment concerns, is faithful to the rule of lenity,
and gives Congress a strong incentive to revise the ACCA.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AND RECENT SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT
Federal law prohibits previously convicted felons from possessing a
firearm.18 Felons who violate this provision receive a maximum sentence of
ten years.19 If, however, a felon has three or more prior convictions for an
ACCA-qualifying "violent felony" or "serious drug offense," that felon will
face a more severe fifteen-year mandatory minimum term of imprison-
ment.20 The ACCA defines a "violent felony" as "any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" that
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.
2 1
Much of the difficulty that sentencing courts have faced in applying the
ACCA has stemmed from the "otherwise involves" language-the language
italicized above in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)-which courts have termed
the "residual clause."22 The confusion over the scope of the clause stems, at
least in part, from its opaque legislative history.
A. Legislative History
Responding to the "unmistakable" conclusion that a "small group [of
criminals] was responsible for an extraordinarily large volume of crime,"
Congress enacted the ACCA in 1984.23 Based on studies and testimony from
local prosecutors regarding the dangerousness of recidivist offenders, Con-
gress intended for the statute to protect citizens from violent criminals by
incarcerating those criminals.24 As the statute's name implies, Congress
18. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
19. Id. § 924(a)(2).
20. Id. § 924(e)(1). The same provision prohibits a court from suspending the sen-
tence of or imposing a probationary sentence on a felon convicted under this statute.
21. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
22. See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 124 (2009).
23. H.R. REP. No. 98-1073, at 2 (1984).
24. Id. ("Both Congress and local prosecutors around the nation have recognized the
importance of incapacitating these repeat offenders.").
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aimed the statute at "career criminals" whose "full-time occupation is crime
for profit ' 25 and who therefore present a serious risk of physical injury to the
public when they possess a weapon. Although Congress's general motiva-
tion for enacting the statute is plain, its rationale for enumerating the four
qualifying predicate offenses, as well as the statute's "residual clause," is
unclear.
26
When Congress first passed the ACCA, the statute included only two
predicate offenses: robbery and burglary. The original statute also defined
both of these enumerated offenses. 28 In 1986, Congress slightly amended the
definition of burglary.29 Five months later, Congress amended the statute to
its current form. 30 This version expanded the range of predicate offenses
from "robbery or burglary" to "a violent felony or a serious drug offense."'"
It also deleted the definition of burglary found in the previous version of the
statute. Finally and most importantly, it added the clause that has presented
courts with such difficulty: a violent felony "is burglary, arson, or extortion,
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another."32 The legislative history
is silent as to why Congress chose those specific enumerated crimes and
why it deleted its previous definition of predicate offenses. 33
25. Id. at 3. For the argument that requiring mere possession of a firearm as a trigger-
ing factor "fails to identify reliably the persons from whom society needs protection," see
Stephen R. Sady, The Armed Career Criminal Act-What's Wrong with "Three Strikes, You're
Out"?, 7 FED. SENT'G Rap. 69,69 (1994).
26. Recent Case, United States v. Woods, 576 F3d 400 (7th Cir 2009), 123 HARV. L.
REv. 760, 766 (2010) ("There is simply no principled basis for saying exactly what Congress
intended the meaning of the residual clause to be... "').
27. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 18, 98 Stat. 2185
(1984), repealedby Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(b), 100 Stat. 449, 459 (1986).
28. Id. at § 1803 (defining robbery as "any felony consisting of the taking of the
property of another from the person or presence of another by force or violence, or by threat-
ening or placing another person in fear that any person will imminently be subjected to bodily
injury" and defining burglary as "any felony consisting of entering or remaining surreptitious-
ly within a building that is property of another with intent to engage in conduct constituting a
Federal or State offense").
29. Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a)(4), 100 Stat. 449,
458-59 (1986).
30. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1402, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-
39 (1986).
31. Id.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). For a more thorough treatment of the
ACCA's legislative history, see Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements:
The Role of Prior Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1135,
1176-80 (2010); James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 537, 545-49 (2009).
33. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 582-88 (1990). For the argument that
Congress left the ACCA intentionally unclear by "resorting to highly general language that
facilitates legislative consensus by deferring resolution of controversial points to the moment
of judicial application' see Recent Case, supra note 26, at 766 (quoting Dan M. Kahan, Leni-
ty and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SuP. CT. REv. 345, 369-70 (1994)).
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B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the ACCA's "Residual Clause"
Called upon to interpret the meaning of the statute, the Supreme Court
has taken a piecemeal approach to clarifying the ACCA's "crime of vio-
lence" category and has modified its view of the residual clause repeatedly
over the past several years. This battery of recent cases has established that a
court must answer two questions when determining whether an offense,
considered in the abstract, falls within the residual clause's scope. First, the
court must determine whether the offense poses "a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another."' If this requirement is met, the court asks a
second question: does the offense pose a comparable level of risk to its
closest analog among the enumerated offenses?3" If the court answers both
questions in the affirmative, the offense will qualifies as a predicate under
the residual clause.
In James v. United States,36 the Supreme Court held that attempted bur-
glary presents a "serious potential risk of physical injury to another," and
therefore qualifies as a predicate crime under the ACCA's residual clause.37
Rejecting James's argument that Congress intended to restrict the ACCA's
residual clause to completed offenses, the Court initially noted that "Con-
gress' inclusion of a broad residual provision in clause (ii) indicates that it
did not intend the preceding enumerated offenses to be an exhaustive list of
the types of crimes that might present a serious risk of injury to others and
therefore merit status as a § 924(e) predicate offense. '38 Because an at-
tempted burglary risks the possibility of a violent face-to-face confrontation
between the burglar and a third party, the Court concluded that attempted
burglary can serve as the basis for an ACCA enhancement. 39 The Court in-
terpreted the residual clause broadly, inferring its use of "potential risk" to
suggest "that Congress intended to encompass possibilities even more con-
tingent or remote than a simple 'risk,' much less a certainty."'4 If an offense,
in the ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another, it
is a valid enhancement predicate.
41
One year later, the Court narrowed the scope of the residual clause in
Begay v. United States, in which it held that driving under the influence of
alcohol is not a "violent felony" under the ACCA.42 If Congress had intend-
ed a broader view of the residual clause, the Court reasoned, Congress
34. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); see Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141
(2008) (assuming that driving under the influence of alcohol poses such a serious risk).
35. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273 (2011).
36. 550 U.S. 192 (2007).
37. James, 550 U.S. at 209.
38. Id. at 200.
39. Id. at 204-05.
40. Id. at 207-08 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 209.
42. 553 U.S. 137, 148 (2008).
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would not have included the example crimes at all.4 3 In their absence, the
clause would simply encompass all crimes that present "a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another"' (the James approach), a much more in-
telligible articulation of sweeping congressional intent. The Court read the
enumerated examples as "limiting the crimes that clause (ii) covers to
crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to
the examples themselves 4 5 In order to qualify as a predicate crime, an of-
fense must involve the same type of "purposeful, violent, and aggressive"
conduct as the listed examples.4 6 Crimes committed in such a manner are
"potentially more dangerous when firearms are involved," and because they
are likely to be committed by career criminals, such a test is consistent with
the purpose of the ACCA itself.
47
In Chambers v. United States,48 the Supreme Court considered whether
failure to report for penal confinement is a "violent felony" under the
ACCA. The defendant was convicted under Illinois's "escape" statute.49 The
Court applied Begay and found that the statute's provisions criminalizing
failure to report constituted a separate crime from the same statute's escape
provisions, because failure to report "would seem less likely to involve a
risk of physical harm than the less passive, more aggressive behavior under-
lying an escape from custody."50 After dividing the statute into two
categories, the Court analyzed whether failure to report qualified as an
ACCA predicate. Because failure to report, "[c]onceptually speaking ...
amounts to a form of inaction," it does not involve the same kind of violent
conduct as the enumerated offenses to satisfy clause (ii).5' The Court there-
fore concluded that the ordinary failure-to-report case falls outside the scope
of the ACCA's residual clause.52
43. Begay, 553 U.S. at 142.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006).
45. Begay, 553 U.S. at 143. When general words follow specific words in a list, the
canon of ejusdem generis "limits general terms which follow specific ones to matters similar
to those specified." Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936). For more detail on
ejusdem generis and its application in the ACCA context, see David C. Holman, Violent
Crimes and Known Associates: The Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 43
CONN. L. REv. 209, 216 (2010).
46. Begay, 553 U.S. at 145.
47. Id. (citing United States v. Begay, 470 F3d 964, 980 (10th Cir. 2006)
(McConnell, J., dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. 555 U.S. 122 (2009).
49. The statute defined seven different types of conduct: (1) escape from a penal
institution, (2) escape from the custody of an employee of a penal institution, (3) failing to
report to a penal institution, (4) failing to report for periodic imprisonment, (5) failing to re-
turn from furlough, (6) failing to return from work and day release, and (7) failing to abide by
the terms of home confinement. 720 ILL. CorP. STAT. 5/31-6(a) (2010).
50. Chambers, 555 U.S. at 127.
51. Id. at 128.
52. Id. at 130.
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The Court reshaped the residual-clause inquiry yet again in its most re-
cent ACCA case, Sykes v. United States.53 There, the Court considered
whether vehicular flight from a police officer was a "violent felony."54 The
Court concluded that it was, but in doing so, it retreated from the "purpose-
ful, violent, and aggressive" analysis it used in Begay and Chambers
because that analysis "has no precise textual link to the residual clause."55
Instead, the Court concluded that "levels of risk divide crimes that qualify
from those that do not."56 To determine whether vehicular flight qualified, it
compared the risk from that crime to the risk "poses by its closest analog
among the enumerated offenses. '57 The Court reasoned that vehicular flight
poses a risk similar to arson, because both crimes involve the "intentional
release of a destructive force dangerous to others."58 And it is similar to bur-
glary because both crimes can end in a violent confrontation with the
police.59 The Court also consulted statistical reports to support the "com-
monsense conclusion" 60 that vehicular flight is a "violent felony" with a
higher incidence of violence than burglary and arson.61 Finally, vehicular
53. 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011).
54. The Indiana statute at issue reads:
Sec. 3. (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally:
(3) flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means,
including operation of the law enforcement officer's siren or emergency lights, identified
himself or herself and ordered the person to stop;
commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor, except as provided in sub-
section (b).
(b) The offense under subsection (a) is a:
(1) Class D felony if:
(A) the offense is described in subsection (a)(3) and the person uses a vehicle to commit
the offense ....
IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3 (2011).
55. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2275. The Court did not expressly reject the purposeful, vio-
lent, and aggressive test, and implied that it may still apply to strict liability, negligence, and
recklessness crimes. Id. at 2275-76; see also id. at 2285 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[The pur-
poseful, violent, and aggressive test] has been neither overlooked nor renounced in today's
tutti-frutti opinion.").
56. Id. at 2275 (majority opinion).
57. Id. at 2273 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203 (2007)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2273-74.
60. Id. at 2274.
61. Id. at 2274-75 (citing several studies from the U.S. Fire Administration to show that
in 2008, approximately 3.3 injuries occurred for every 100 arsons committed); SiHANNAN
CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VICTIMIZATION DURING HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY 1
(2010) (concluding that "[i]n 7% of all household burglaries, a household member experienced
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flight-as proscribed by the Indiana statute-requires a mens rea of "know-
ingly or intentionally," rather than strict liability.6" Together, these reasons
supported a conclusion that vehicular flight presents a serious potential risk
of physical injury to another.
Despite the residual clause's straightforward language, the Court itself
has acknowledged that the residual-clause inquiry remains abstract and dif-
ficult to apply.63 The four enumerated offenses, which bear little relation to
each other with respect to the degree of risk posed, seem arbitrarily chosen,
and legislative history does not illuminate the reasons why Congress chose
them. Justice Scalia has noted that the uncertainty still present in the residu-
al clause leaves courts in a difficult position:
They can (1) apply the ACCA enhancement to virtually all predicate of-
fenses; (2) apply it case by case in its pristine abstraction, finding it
applicable whenever the particular sentencing judge (or the particular re-
viewing panel) believes there is a "serious potential risk of physical injury
to another" (whatever that means); (3) try to figure out a coherent way of
interpreting the statute so that it applies in a relatively predictable and ad-
ministrable fashion to a smaller subset of crimes; or (4) recognize the
statute for the drafting failure it is and hold it void for vagueness.6
The Court's recent ACCA cases indicate that it has chosen the second op-
tion, but its consistent refashioning of its interpretive approach in recent
years suggests that the Court has not been entirely successful.
The residual clause, in short, is "a moving target."65 And unfortunately,
while the Court has struggled to articulate the correct questions to ask in a
residual-clause inquiry, its methods of answering those questions-
described below as the "categorical" and "modified categorical"
approaches---only add to the confusion.
II. THE "CATEGORICAL" AND "MODIFIED CATEGORICAL" APPROACHES
TO INTERPRETING ACCA PREDICATE OFFENSES
The "categorical approach" represents the default approach by which
courts analyze whether a defendant's prior conviction counts as a "violent
felony" under the ACCA's residual clause. But the categorical approach is
insufficient when a sentencing court must classify a prior conviction under a
statute that covers a broad range of conduct, only some of which would
qualify as a predicate offense. In these circumstances, courts employ the
some form of violent victimization"); CYNTHIA LUM & GEORGE FACHNER, INT'L ASS'N OF
CHIEFS OF POLICE, POLICE PURSUITS IN AN AGE OF INNOVATION AND REFORM 57 (2008)
(concluding that vehicle flight seriously injures bystanders in 4 percent of pursuits).
62. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2275 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 133-34 (2009) (Alito, J., concur-
ring); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 230 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that
the ACCA's "tedious" definition of a violent felony leads to unpredictable application that the
"violates... the constitutional prohibition against vague criminal laws").
64. James, 550 U.S. at 229-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
65. United States v. Oliveira, 798 F. Supp. 2d 319, 328 (D. Mass. 2011).
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"modified categorical approach," which allows them to consider additional
fact-disclosing documents to determine which part of a statute the defendant
violated. This Part provides more detail on these interpretive approaches.
Section II.A outlines the "categorical approach." Section 11.B reviews the
"modified categorical approach."
A. The "Categorical Approach": Taylor v. United States
The categorical approach originates in Taylor v. United States, in which
the Supreme Court interpreted the ACCA to require courts to ignore the par-
ticular defendant's conduct and ask instead whether the elements of the
offense present a serious risk of physical injury to another.66 The Court
based its opinion in part on the text of the ACCA itself, which refers to "'a
person who ... has three previous convictions' for-not a person who has
committed-three previous violent felonies or drug offenses" 67 The statute
also focuses on crimes that have as an "element" the use of force against
another, as opposed to crimes committed in a forceful manner.68 Surveying
the statute's legislative history, the Court noted that despite the extensive
debate over what offenses should count for ACCA purposes, Congress never
considered the possibility that an offense might count if it was committed in
a violent way but be excluded if that same offense was committed in a non-
violent way.69 If Congress had considered the possibility and concluded that
courts should engage in such a thorough fact finding process, it would have
said so.
70
Finally, the Court observed that "the practical difficulties and potential
unfairness of a factual approach are daunting. '71 An indictment or charging
document might contain an insufficient factual record--or, in a pleaded
case, no record whatsoever-for a sentencing court to determine what the
defendant actually did.72 Moreover, if a defendant was convicted under a
statute containing both ACCA-qualifying and non-ACCA-qualifying offens-
es, but the sentencing judge, after reviewing the facts, concluded that the
defendant committed an ACCA-qualifying crime, the defendant might argue
66. 495 U.S. 575, 600-02 (1990).
67. Taylor. 495 U.S. at 600-01 (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)
(2006)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 601.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 601-02. The categorical approach has been criticized as leading to unfair
outcomes. See United States v. Thomas, 333 F.3d 280, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (questioning the
application of the categorical approach to all escape offenses because different methods of
escape present different risks of injury to others); Timothy W. Castor, Note, Escaping a Rigid
Analysis: The Shift to a Fact-Based Approach for Crime of Violence Inquiries Involving Es-
cape Offenses, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 345, 362-71 (2004) (proposing that courts employ a
fact-based approach to analyze escape cases).
72. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601-02; see also Russell, supra note 32, at 1220-28; Castor,
supra note 71, at 364.
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that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated.7 3 The jury, the
defendant might say, could have convicted him on a theory that did not re-
quire a finding that he had committed an ACCA-qualifying crime.74
The categorical approach requires courts to consider only whether the
statutory elements of the offense categorically encompass violent conduct.
Recent ACCA case law, however, has led courts to deviate from this ap-
proach, such that the way courts are employing-and should employ-the
categorical approach has itself become a disputed matter." Some courts,
focusing on James's instruction to identify whether the "ordinary case" in-
volves violent conduct, simply employ their imagination to hypothesize how
the ordinary crime might actually occur.7 6 Empirical evidence represents
another way of identifying whether a statute covers categorically violent
crime.77 In Chambers, the Court consulted a Sentencing Commission report
documenting every failure-to-report case over the previous two years. 78 The
report found that none of the 160 federal failure-to-report cases in 2006 and
2007 involved violent conduct, in either the commission of the offense or
the subsequent apprehension of the offender.7 9 Using this empirical evi-
dence, the Court concluded that failure to report for penal confinement is
not a violent felony for ACCA purposes.80 The Court conducted a similar
statistical analysis in Sykes with regard to incidence of violence from vehic-
ular flight.81
73. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601. A decade later, the Court held that any fact (other than a
prior conviction) sufficient to raise the limit of the possible federal sentence must be found by
a jury. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
74. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601; see also infra Section V.A.
75. See United States v. Terrell, 621 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010) (M. Smith, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (acknowledging that "reasonable minds may
disagree on how one should go about applying Taylor's categorical approach and what exactly
the Supreme Court has in mind when it repeatedly tells us that we are not to consider 'how an
individual offender might have committed [the offense] on a particular occasion'" (alteration
in original) (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008))); Holman, supra note
45, at 243 ("James, Begay, and Chambers progressively eroded the categorical approach and
encouraged sentencing courts to determine whether someone could have committed the crime
violently."). The Supreme Court has acknowledged the difficulty of assessing the risk posed by
the range of state crimes of which ACCA defendants have been convicted. See James v. Unit-
ed States, 550 U.S. 192, 210 n.6 (2007) (noting that the ACCA "requires judges to make
sometimes difficult evaluations of the risks posed by different offenses").
76. Holman, supra note 45, at 243-44.
77. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2274 (2011) (noting that statistics are
"not dispositive" but can be used to "confirm" a conclusion that a particular offense is a "vio-
lent felony").
78. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 129 (2009) (citing U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, REPORT ON FEDERAL ESCAPE OFFENSES IN FISCAL YEARS 2006 AND 2007, at 6-7
(2008)).
79. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT ON FEDERAL ESCAPE OFFENSES IN Fis-
CAL YEARS 2006 AND 2007, at 6-7 (2008).
80. Chambers, 555 U.S. at 129.
81. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia has questioned the
Court's unquestioned acceptance of the methodology and reliability of these statistics. Sykes,
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Still other courts, when lacking empirical evidence, ask whether there is
a "realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would ap-
ply its statute to conduct that falls outside" of the residual clause.
82
Demonstrating such a probability requires "more than the application of
legal imagination to a state statute's language."83 The defendant must point
to actual cases-either his own or others-in which the statute has been
applied to conduct that does not present a serious potential risk of physical
injury.84 It is not necessary for every conceivable variation of the offense to
present that risk in order for the offense to be deemed a "violent felony,"85 but
131 S. Ct. at 2286 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To him, relying upon such statistics, which appear in
the case for the first time at the Supreme Court level, constitutes inappropriate "judicial fact-
finding masquerading as statutory interpretation." Id. For an additional critique of "[tihe
[j]udge as [s]tatistician," as well as instances in which circuit courts have actually misused
statistics, see Holman, supra note 45, at 250-53.
82. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007).
83. Id.; see also Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2281 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring).
84. See United States v. Mayer, 560 .3d 948, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (identifying Oregon's burglary statute, used to
convict a defendant who stole change from coin boxes in public phone booths in State v. Keys,
419 P.2d 943 (Or. 1966), as an example of a state statute used to convict people for conduct
which poses no risk of violence and is therefore beyond the scope of the ACCA's residual
clause); Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193.
United States v. Cadieux, 500 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2007), illustrates this analytical process.
The defendant argued that his conviction for indecent assault and battery on a child under
fourteen was not a violent felony for ACCA purposes. Id. at 42. The statute he violated, id. at
44 n.4, read:
Whoever commits an indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen
shall be punished .... In a prosecution under this section, a child under the age of four-
teen years shall be deemed incapable of consenting to any conduct of the defendant for
which said defendant is being prosecuted.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13B (1989). The defendant contended that this statute did not
qualify as a statute covering categorically violent crime because it did not provide a child's
consent as a defense and did not specify a minimum age gap between victim and perpetrator.
Cadieux, 500 F.3d at 46. Therefore, the statute encompassed "consensual sexual contact be-
tween similarly-aged teenagers, for example, a fourteen-year-old and a thirteen-year-old who
are simply making out." Id. The court noted that the argument "gives us pause," but neverthe-
less rejected it, because the court had "scoured the caselaw and could not discover a single
reported case in which a juvenile was convicted under [the statute] for consensual sexual ac-
tivity with a similarly-aged youth." Id.
Doug Keller contends that this analytical approach, which he calls the "evidentiary-
burden view," is not uniformly applied by the circuit courts. Doug Keller, Causing Mischief
for Taylor's Categorical Approach: Applying "Legal Imagination" to Duenas-Alvarez, 18
GEO. MASON L. REV. 625, 637-38 (2011). A second group of circuits applies the "novel-
interpretation view," which requires the defendant to point to actual cases only when he or she
"offers a novel interpretation of state law to establish that the state statute is broader than the
federal statutory hook at issue." Id. at 644; see, e.g., United States v. Madera, 521 E Supp. 2d
149, 156-57 (D. Conn. 2007) (interpreting the ACCA's "serious drug crime" provision).
85. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007).
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all or almost all conduct under the statute would likely have to be violent for
a court to conclude that the statute meets the ACCA's requirements. s6
In short, although the Supreme Court's recent ACCA case law has
muddled its application, the categorical approach, properly applied, re-
quires the judge to decide whether the statutory conduct encompassed by
the elements of the offense-in the abstract rather than in the defendant's
particular case-presents a serious potential risk of injury to another.
B. The "Modified Categorical Approach": Shepard v. United States
The categorical approach answers most questions about the proper cate-
gorization of a prior offense, but it is not helpful when a statute includes
conduct that would qualify as an ACCA predicate as well as conduct that
would not qualify. In such a case, the sentencing court must look deeper in
order to identify the offense for which the defendant was convicted. Consid-
er this example: Massachusetts includes, in a single statutory section
entitled "Breaking and entering at night," burglary of a "building, ship, ves-
sel, or vehicle. '87 In Taylor, the Court held that only burglary of a building
possesses the serious potential risk of physical injury to another that is
needed to qualify as a "violent felony" under the ACCA.88 A sentencing
court evaluating a conviction under Massachusetts's breaking-and-entering
statute must choose the right category of offense. Did the defendant burglar-
ize a building, the qualifying predicate, or a vehicle, a nonqualifying
predicate?89 If the court only knows that the defendant was convicted under
the all-encompassing statute, the choice is "not obvious."90 The generic con-
sideration of the offense in the categorical approach is not helpful when a
court cannot determine which offense the defendant committed.
Recognizing this difficulty, the Court held in Shepard v. United States
that courts facing such an issue may examine a limited set of documents to
determine whether the jury convicted the defendant of a "violent felony."91
86. The Supreme Court has not articulated a more precise percentage of cases involv-
ing violent conduct in order for a statute to be considered to cover categorically violent crime.
See id. ("[T]he proper inquiry is whether the conduct encompassed by the elements of the
offense, in the ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another."); United
States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[A] crime must be categorized as one of
violence even if, through some freak chance, the conduct did not turn out to be violent in an
unusual case.").
87. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 16 (2010). The Illinois statute the Court examines in
Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009), provides another example. See 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. § 5/31-6(a) (2010).
88. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598-99 (1990).
89. Chambers, 555 U.S. at 126 (stating that the behavior underlying breaking into a
building differs so significantly from the behavior underlying breaking into a vehicle that
sentencing courts must treat them as separate crimes for ACCA purposes).
90. Id.
91. 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).
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In this inquiry, called the "modified categorical approach, '9 2 courts may
view "the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement,
transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge
to which the defendant assented."93 This wider evidentiary net, at least in
theory, allows courts to determine which part of the statute a defendant vio-
lated. Indeed, the modified categorical approach is available only for the
purpose of categorizing offenses; it does not allow courts to ignore the cate-
gorical approach in favor of the full factual inquiry rejected in Taylor.9'
Thus, in the Massachusetts burglary statute described above, the court could
only consult the Shepard documents to determine whether the defendant
burglarized a building (the ACCA-qualifying category) or a vehicle (the
non-ACCA qualifying offense). It could not use the documents to inquire
into whether the defendant committed the burglary in a violent way.
In summary, when a judge considers whether a prior conviction counts
as an ACCA predicate, the judge begins, as directed by the categorical ap-
proach, with the language of the statute the defendant violated. If the statute
is "divisible," meaning that it encompasses a broader swath of conduct than
that which would qualify as a predicate conviction under the ACCA, the
court applies the modified categorical approach and consults the limited set
of authorized documents to determine which part of the statute the defend-
ant violated.95 If the relevant documents reveal that the defendant violated
the ACCA-qualifying part of the statute, the judge counts the conviction as a
predicate offense. If the relevant documents either show that the defendant
violated the nonqualifying part of the statute or do not reveal which part of
the statute the defendant violated, the court does not include the conviction
for enhancement purposes.
96
92. See, e.g., United States v. Rivers, 595 F.3d 558, 562 (4th Cir. 2010), abrogated by
Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011); United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 405
(7th Cir. 2009).
93. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16. The Court held that courts may not look at police reports
or complaint applications in this inquiry. Id.
94. Id. at 20 ("The Taylor Court drew a pragmatic conclusion about the best way to
identify generic convictions in jury cases... that avoids subsequent evidentiary enquiries into
the factual basis for the earlier conviction.").
95. If the prior conviction resulted from a jury trial, the court may look to the indict-
ment and the jury instructions from the trial to see if those documents indicate whether the
defendant violated the qualifying or nonqualifying part of the statute. If the defendant pleaded
guilty to violating the statute in question, the judge may look at "the terms of a plea agreement
or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea
was confirmed by the defendant." Id. at 26.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Savage, 542 E3d 959, 966-67 (2d Cir. 2008). For a
discussion of the government's frequent inability to meet its burden of production under the
Shepard-authorized documents, and the contention that Shepard may be used strategically to
reduce the application of sentencing enhancements, see Russell, supra note 32, at 1203-32.
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III. ASSESSING DIVISIBILITY: THE "FORMAL" AND "FUNCTIONAL"
METHODS OF MOVING FROM THE CATEGORICAL TO THE
MODIFIED CATEGORICAL APPROACH
A split has developed among the circuit courts about when a statute is
considered "divisible," or inclusive of qualifying and nonqualifying conduct.
Because divisibility is a prerequisite for departing from the categorical ap-
proach, the circuit split ultimately implicates whether a court will employ
the categorical approach or the more searching modified categorical ap-
proach. At least three circuits (the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth) employ a
"formal" method that uses the text of the statute in question as the sole de-
terminant of a statute's divisibility.97 Three other circuits (the First, Sixth,
and Eighth) use a more "functional" method that focuses on how a particu-
lar crime is committed as a practical matter when assessing a statute's
divisibility.98
A. The "Formal" Method
The formal method consults only the text of the statute in question when
determining whether a statute is divisible. Under the formal method, a stat-
ute is divisible when its text "expressly identifies several ways in which a
violation may occur."99 More specifically, the formal method allows a sen-
tencing court to refer to the Shepard-authorized documents "[w]hen a
statute encompasses multiple categories of offense conduct-some of which
would constitute a violent felony and some of which would not.' '" °" If a stat-
ute is divisible, the court then employs the modified categorical approach,
referring to the Shepard documents to determine "which part of a divisible
statute was charged against a defendant and, therefore, which part of the
statute to examine on its face."' 1 Again, this inquiry is not intended to de-
termine whether the defendant actually committed the crime in a violent
way.1 2 Rather, it aims to categorize the defendant's conduct so that a court
may analyze whether, "in the ordinary case, [it] presents a serious potential
risk of injury to another."'1 3
97. See Rivers, 595 F.3d at 564; Woods, 576 F.3d at 406; United States v. Zuniga-
Soto, 527 F.3d 1110, 1121 (10th Cir. 2008).
98. See United States v. Parks, 620 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Pratt, 568 F.3d 11, 21-22 (lst Cir. 2009); United States v. Ford, 560 F3d 420, 424 (6th Cir.
2009).
99. Woods, 576 F.3d at 406; see also Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d at 1121 ("[A] sentencing
court ... may consult the judicial records approved in Shepard in order to ascertain which
definition of a crime to evaluate in the event that a statute defines a particular offense in more
than one way.").
100. Woods, 576 F.3d at 404 (quoting United States v. Smith, 544 F.3d 781, 786 (7th
Cir. 2008)).
101. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d at 1113.
102. Such a factual inquiry would raise the Apprendi concerns discussed infra in Sec-
tion V.A. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 25 (2005).
103. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007).
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Consider two examples, in which courts interpret similar statutes in the
same manner, but reach different results. South Carolina has a "blue light"
statute that makes it a crime to fail to stop when signaled to do so by a law
enforcement officer. The statute reads:
In the absence of mitigating circumstances, it is unlawful for a motor vehi-
cle driver, while driving on a road, street, or highway of the State, to fail to
stop when signaled by a law enforcement vehicle by means of a siren or
flashing light. An attempt to increase the speed of a vehicle or in other
manner avoid the pursuing law enforcement vehicle when signaled by a si-
ren or flashing light is prima facie evidence of a violation of this section."°
In United States v. Rivers, the defendant contended that his conviction for
violating this statute was not a "violent felony" under the ACCA. The
Fourth Circuit did not use the modified categorical approach, because the
statute's text "proscribes only one type of behavior: failing to stop for a blue
light."105 Because "lt]here is no varied behavior underlying the elements of a
blue light offense," the statute "only contains one category of crime," and
the statute is therefore not divisible. 1 6 Under the categorical approach, the
court found that, as a strict liability offense, the statute criminalized a
broader range of conduct than the purposeful, violent, and aggressive con-
duct typical of ACCA's enumerated crimes.0 7 Considering the risk posed by
the ordinary failure-to-stop case, the offense proscribed by the statute did
not constitute a "violent felony." Therefore, the court did not count the con-
viction as an ACCA predicate and remanded the case for resentencing. 1°8
The Seventh Circuit reached a different conclusion when applying the
formal method to Wisconsin's vehicular-fleeing offense, which states the
following:
No operator of a vehicle, after having received a visual or audible signal
from a traffic officer, or marked police vehicle, shall knowingly flee or at-
tempt to elude any traffic officer by willful or wanton disregard of such
signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of the police vehi-
cle, or the traffic officer or other vehicles or pedestrians, nor shall the
operator increase the speed of the operator's vehicle or extinguish the
lights of the vehicle in an attempt to elude or flee." 9
The court used the text of the statute to divide it into two categories of be-
havior: (1) fleeing or attempting to elude "by willful or wanton disregard of
[the officer's] signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of the
police vehicle, or the traffic officer or other vehicles or pedestrians," and
(2) "increas[ing] the speed of the operator's vehicle or extinguish[ing] the
104. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-750(A) (2006).
105. United States v. Rivers, 595 E3d 558, 564 (4th Cir. 2010), abrogated by Sykes v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011).
106. Id. at 564.
107. Id. at 565.
108. Id.
109. WIs. STAT. § 346.04(3) (2011).
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lights of the vehicle in an attempt to elude or flee."' 10 Finding that the statute
was divisible, the court employed the modified categorical approach and,
after viewing the criminal complaint, held that the defendant was charged
with committing the latter offense."' The court found that fleeing from a
police officer in such a manner presents "a similar potential for violence and
therefore injury as the enumerated offenses."" 2 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that vehicular flight from a police officer was properly classified as a
"violent felony" for ACCA purposes."13
B. The "Functional" Method
By contrast, the functional method does not rely entirely on the text of
the applicable statute when assessing divisibility. Instead, it gives greater
weight to how the crime is committed as a practical matter. Courts that ap-
ply the functional method will move to the modified categorical approach
"[i]f it is possible to violate a criminal law in a way that amounts to a crime
of violence and in a way that does not."' ' Regardless of whether the stat-
ute's text enumerates different categories of conduct under the banner of a
single offense, the functional method will consider a statute overinclusive if
it "covers conduct that does and does not trigger the career offender en-
hancement."" 5
For example, New Hampshire's criminal escape statute provides the fol-
lowing:
I. A person is guilty of an offense if he escapes from official custody.
II. "Official custody" means arrest, custody in a penal institution, an insti-
tution for confinement of juvenile offenders or other confinement
pursuant to an order of a court.
111. The offense is a class A felony if the actor employs force against any
person or threatens any person with a deadly weapon to effect the es-
cape, except that if the deadly weapon is a firearm, he shall be
sentenced in accordance with RSA 651:2, II-g. Otherwise it is a class B
felony. 116
In United States v. Pratt, the First Circuit noted that while this statute did
distinguish between escapes committed with and without a violent weapon,
110. United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582, 590 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting
§ 346.04(3)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at 590-91.
112. Id. at 594.
113. Id. at 596.
114. United States v. Ford, 560 F.3d 420, 422 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding divisible and
applying the modified categorical approach to a second-degree escape statute whose text "co-
vers everything from a felon who breaks out of a maximum-security prison to one who fails to
report to a halfway house").
115. United States v. Pearson, 553 F.3d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir. 2009).
116. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 642:6 (2007).
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it did not distinguish between types of confinement.' 7 Thus, "[tihe Class B
felony ... covers a category of escapes that includes both [the defendant's]
failure to return from a break at a halfway house and the prisoner who man-
ages to break out of jail by stealth."I 8 Despite its lack of textual divisibility,
the court nevertheless divided the Class B felony into two categories: "fail-
ure to report" and "escape from secure custody."'1 9 After employing the
modified categorical approach and learning that Pratt had escaped from jail
by crawling under a fence and leaving the area, the court concluded that
Pratt had been convicted of the "escape from secure custody" portion of the
statute. 120 The court then found that "escape from secure custody" categori-
cally involves the "less passive, more aggressive conduct"' 2' l that is "roughly
similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed,'12 2 to the enumerated
crimes, and concluded that escape from secure custody is a violent felony
within the meaning of the ACCA.
123
The federal criminal escape statute best illustrates the difference be-
tween the two methods. Courts employing both the formal and functional
methods have analyzed this statute, which provides the following:
Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the Attorney
tGeneral or his authorized representative, or from any institution or facility
in which he is confined by direction of the Attorney General, or from any
custody under or by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the
United States ... or from the custody of an officer or employee of the
United States pursuant to lawful arrest, shall, if the custody or confinement
is by virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony, or conviction of any offense,
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both
124
Applying the formal method, the Seventh Circuit found that, while the
"statute covers a wide range of conduct, from violent jailbreaks to quiet
walkaways to passive failures to report," its text does not "enumerate explic-
itly the different ways in which the statute can be violated," and it is
therefore not divisible. 25 Faced with the difficult task of affixing a categori-
cally "violent" or "non-violent" label to such a broadly written statute, the
court asked, "[WIhat is the 'nature' of a crime that can be committed in so
117. 568 .3d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 2009).
118. Pratt, 568 F.3d at 20 (quoting United States v. Winn, 364 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir.
2004), abrogated by Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009) (holding that fail-
ures to report and escapes from custody do not belong to the same category of crimes for
ACCA purposes, even if grouped together within a single criminal statute)).
119. Seeid. at21.
120. Id. at 21-22.
121. Id. at 22 (quoting Chambers, 555 U.S. at 127).
122. Id. (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008)).
123. Id.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (2006).
125. See United States v. Hart, 578 F.3d 674, 681 (7th Cir. 2009).
1539June 20121
Michigan Law Review
many different ways?"' 126 It answered its own question: because it is possible
for one to commit escape without putting anyone in harm's way, criminal
escape is not a categorically violent crime.1
27
Yet the Eighth Circuit explicitly disagreed with both the formal method
and the resulting categorization when it interpreted the same statute. 128 The
court read Chambers as instructing sentencing courts to determine whether
the risks posed by the categories of conduct within a statute are so substantial-
ly different that the court must treat the statutory categories as separate crimes
for ACCA purposes, even though the categories are part of an identically
numbered statutory section. 129  This instruction "suggests that over-
inclusiveness for career offender purposes may arise even if a criminal
statute ... is not textually divisible.' ' 30 The Eighth Circuit found that
because "escaping[ing] or attempt[ing] to escape from the custody of the
Attorney General"' 3' includes such passive conduct as failing to return to
custody, the federal criminal escape statute is overinclusive and triggers the
modified categorical approach. 132 The court then viewed the permissible
judicial records and learned that the defendant ran past a security guard and
out of a gate that had been opened for the routine intake of inmates.
13
Therefore, the defendant committed the generic crime of escape from a se-





128. See United States v. Parks, 620 F.3d 911, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2010). The Seventh
Circuit has itself acknowledged the arbitrary nature of hinging its divisibility analysis on the
statute's text alone. See United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 2009) ("One could
argue that it is artificial to draw a line between, on the one hand, general statutes that prohibit
both violent and nonviolent conduct, and, on the other, statutes that differentiate between
violent and nonviolent offenses.").
129. The Court did exactly this in Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009). It
concluded that "failure to report ... is a separate crime, different from escape," even though
they are part of the same criminal statute. Id. at 126-27.
130. Parks, 620 F.3d at 914. The Eighth Circuit has provided some support for the
formal method in other opinions. See United States v. Salean, 583 F.3d 1059, 1061 (8th Cir.
2009); United States v. Boaz, 558 F.3d 800, 807 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing U.S. v. Livingston, 442
F.3d 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 2006)) ("When the law defines an offense by proscribing several
discrete, alternative sets of elements that might be shown as different manners of committing
the offense, we employ the modified categorical approach that permits examination of a lim-
ited class of materials to determine which set of elements the defendant was found to have
violated.").
131. United States v. Pearson, 553 E3d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir. 2009) (alternations in
original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 751 (a) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Id. at 1186; see also United States v. Jackson, 594 F.3d 1027, 1029-30 n.2 (8th
Cir. 2010) ("We have recognized that § 751 (a) defines multiple different offenses, is therefore
overinclusive,' and is subject to analysis as per the modified categorical approach ... .
133. Parks, 620 F.3d at 916.
134. Id.
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IV. THE FORMAL METHOD IS MORE CONSISTENT WITH SUPREME
COURT ACCA JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court has not expressly endorsed one method of assessing
divisibility. This Part, however, contends that the formal method is the most
consistent with the Court's ACCA jurisprudence. Section IV.A asserts that
the Court has provided implicit support for the formal method when dis-
cussing its ACCA cases in another context. Section IV.B argues that the
formal method more closely tracks the Court's record of dividing the stat-
utes that it has categorized. Finally, Section IV.C contends that the
functional method is inconsistent with the categorical approach, the default
interpretive framework in ACCA cases.
A. The Supreme Court Has Provided Implicit Support
for the Formal Method
The Supreme Court has suggested that a sentencing court may only con-
sult the additional materials permitted by the modified categorical approach
if the statute's text contains multiple offense categories, some of which
would constitute a crime of violence and some of which would not. In a
non-ACCA case, Nijhawan v. Holder, the Court considered a provision of
the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") that defined an "aggravated
felony" for deportation purposes. 135 The Court distinguished a portion of the
INA, which it characterized as circumstance specific, from the ACCA,
which uses a categorical approach.136 Referring to its past ACCA cases, the
Court said, "Taylor, James, and Shepard, the cases that developed the evi-
dentiary list to which petitioner points, developed that list for a very
different purpose, namely that of determining which statutory phrase (con-
tained within a statutory provision that covers several different generic
crimes) covered a prior conviction."'13 7 Courts using the formal method have
seized on this statement as confirmation of their practice of dividing statutes
only when the statutes "expressly identif[y] several ways in which a viola-
tion may occur" and consulting the Shepard documents only to determine
"under which part of a divisible statute the defendant was charged.' 138 The
Court's statement in Nijhawan does not expressly reject the functional
135. 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009). The statute defined an "aggravated felony" as, inter alia,
"an offense that... involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds
$10,000." 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2006), quoted in Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2297. The
question in the case was whether the specific statute under which the defendant was convicted
must include in its text the $10,000 minimum loss amount as an element of the offense (i.e., a
text-based formal method), or whether the requisite loss amount resulting from the defend-
ant's actual conduct must exceed $10,000 to satisfy the INA's definition (i.e., a conduct-based
functional method). Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2297.
136. Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2297-98.
137. Id. at 2303 (emphasis added).
138. United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400,406 (7th Cir. 2009).
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method, but it nevertheless implies that the Court considers the statutory text
the appropriate place to look when conducting a divisibility analysis.
B. The Formal Method Is More Consistent with the Supreme Court's
Record of Dividing Statutes
The formal method more closely tracks the Court's actual practice of di-
viding statutes for ACCA purposes. In short, the Court has divided formally
divisible statutes and failed to divide formally indivisible statutes.
The statutes at issue in Taylor, the case in which the Court first set out
the categorical approach in the ACCA context, were formally divisible.'39 At
the time that the defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary, Mis-
souri had seven different second-degree burglary statutes.' 4° Because those
statutes criminalized entry into buildings and other structures,' 4' which the
Court held to be a necessary part of a burglary conviction for ACCA pur-
poses, 142 the statutes contained both violent and nonviolent offense
categories. The Court noted that "[d]espite the Government's argument to
the contrary, it is not apparent to us from the sparse record before us which
of those statutes were the basis for Taylor's prior convictions.' 43 The Court
remanded the case for the lower court to properly categorize Taylor's con-
viction for enhancement purposes. The Illinois escape statute at issue in
Chambers followed a similar pattern. It listed seven different ways in which
a defendant could be convicted of "escape,: some of which encompassed
violent conduct and some of which did not.'" Thus, it was formally divisi-
ble, and the Court divided it, "treat[ing] the statute for ACCA purposes as
containing at least two separate crimes, namely, escape from custody on the
one hand, and a failure to report on the other."'' 45
By contrast, the Court has not divided statutes that are functionally-but
not formally-divisible. 46 Consider the attempt statute at issue in James.147
139. See id. at 407 ("[T]he statute before the Court in Taylor was a divisible one, as we
are using that term"). But see id. at 415 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc) ("So instead of asking whether a state law is 'divisible,' we should ask whether the
jury (or judge) necessarily found all the elements required to classify the crime as 'violent' for
federal purposes.").
140. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 578 n.l (1990). In 1979, Missouri
replaced these statutes with a more generic statute. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 569.170 (2000).
141. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 578 n. 1.
142. Id. at 598-99.
143. Id. at 602.
144. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/31-6(a) (2010).
145. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 127 (2009).
146. Because it is not guaranteed that a lower court would have divided these func-
tionally divisible statutes anyway, the Supreme Court's refusal to divide them does not
automatically establish a preference for the formal method. But given that a division was at
least possible-yet nevertheless not undertaken-in James and Sykes, the Court's categorical
consideration of the statute does provide some support for the formal method.
147. FLA. STAT. § 777.04(1) (2010) ("A person who attempts to commit an offense
prohibited by law and in such attempt does any act toward the commission of such offense,
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The text of the statute does not create multiple offense categories. It is, how-
ever, possible to attempt a crime in a way that would amount to a crime of
violence and in a way that would not. The attempt statute is therefore for-
mally indivisible but functionally divisible. Yet the Supreme Court did not
turn to the modified categorical approach when categorizing attempted bur-
glary as an ACCA predicate. Rather, it simply analyzed whether, in the
ordinary case, attempted burglary presents a serious risk of physical injury
to another. 48 Concluding that it does, the Court counted attempted burglary
as an ACCA predicate.149 The same is true of the New Mexico statute at is-
sue in Begay. The statute contained only one offense category: driving with
a blood-alcohol concentration of greater than eight one-hundredths. 50 In-
stead of using the modified categorical approach, the Court analyzed
whether drunk driving was similar in kind and in degree of risk posed to the
enumerated crimes.' 5' The same is true of Sykes.'52 The Court did not divide
the statute but instead analyzed whether vehicular flight from a police of-
ficer is categorically violent.'53
C. The Functional Method Is Inconsistent with the Categorical Approach
By hinging the divisibility analysis on a judge's intuition regarding the
means of committing a crime, the functional method permits a judge to by-
pass the categorical approach in favor of a fact-based inquiry into the
defendant's prior conduct-precisely the inquiry the Supreme Court rejected
in Taylor. Taylor held, and Shepard reiterated, 54 that the modified
categorical approach should only be applied in "a narrow range of cases. ' 55
Case-by-case determinations (utilizing the expanded inquiry in the modified
categorical approach) of whether a prior violation of a statute posed the req-
uisite risk of violence for ACCA predicate status are the exception, not the
rule.
56
but fails in the perpetration or is intercepted or prevented in the execution thereof, commits the
offense of criminal attempt .... ").
148. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192,208 (2007).
149. Id. at 209.
150. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(C)(1) (Supp. 2011).
151. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-45 (2008).
152. The Indiana statute at issue in Sykes criminalized "flee[ing] from a law enforce-
ment officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means ... identified himself ... and
ordered the person to stop." IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3(a)(3) (2011). The defendant was convicted
of a Class D felony because he committed "the offense [as] described in subsection (a)(3) and
... use[d] a vehicle to commit the offense" Id. § 35-44-3-3(b)(1)(A).
153. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273-76 (2011).
154. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24-26 (2005).
155. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
156. This is appropriate in order to stay faithful to the statute's text and legislative
history, as well as to avoid evidentiary difficulties and Sixth Amendment challenges, all of
which are described supra in Section Il.A.
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The functional method, however, places no limit on the judge's ability to
reach the modified categorical approach. Because it is very often possible
(at least in theory) for a crime to be committed in a violent and a nonviolent
way, a judge applying the functional method will have little trouble dividing
the statute and conducting the expanded factual inquiry. Dividing a statute
does not inherently pose a problem. But a problem does lie in the judge's
ability to create arbitrary divisions that collapse the distinction between the
categorical approach and the modified categorical approach and that serve
only to permit the court to consult the Shepard documents, despite the Su-
preme Court's warning not to do so. 157 In other words, when judges use the
functional method, they run the risk of allowing the modified categorical
approach exception to swallow the categorical approach rule.
Consider Kentucky's second-degree escape statute, for instance. It states
that "[a] person is guilty of escape in the second degree when he escapes from
a detention facility or, being charged with or convicted of a felony, he escapes
from custody."'58 Interpreting the statute in United States v. Ford, the Sixth
Circuit noted initially that the statute covers everything from "a felon who
breaks out of a maximum-security prison to one who fails to report to a half-
way house."'5 9 After consulting additional Kentucky escape laws, 160 the court
functionally divided Kentucky escape law into four categories: (1) leaving
custody with the use or threat of force, (2) leaving custody in a secured set-
ting, (3) leaving custody in a nonsecured setting by "walking away," and
(4) failing to report. 6' Because it tracks differences in conduct that plausibly
correlate to different risk levels, this is a defensible division.
The functional method, however, would just as easily have allowed the
Ford court to divide the Kentucky escape law in a more artificial way de-
signed to allow the judge to reach the modified categorical approach:
"escapes involving a serious potential risk of injury to another" and "es-
capes not involving a serious potential risk of injury to another." The court
could then have consulted the Shepard documents, viewed the facts that led
to the defendant's conviction, and categorized that conviction accordingly.
This uncabined judicial discretion brings little clarity or predictability to a
157. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. A functional-method court might have to identify at least
plausible differences in risk levels posed by the conduct encompassed by the statute in order
to divide it. Whether courts have actually identified plausible differences is an empirical ques-
tion for which there is no available data. It is safe to say, though, that the functional method
gives judges more discretion to create categories-principled or arbitrary-divide statutes, and
utilize the modified categorical approach.
158. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 520.030(1) (LexisNexis 2008).
159. 560 F.3d 420, 422 (6th Cir. 2009).
160. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 520.010(5) (LexisNexis 2008) (defining escape as
departing from custody or a detention center "when the departure is unpermitted" or failing to
return to such a facility "following a temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or for a
limited period"); id. § 520.020(1) (criminalizing first-degree escape, which covers "escapes
from custody or a detention facility by the use of force or threat of force against another per-
son").
161. Ford, 560 F.3d at 424.
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statute marked by vagueness, and the Ford court recognized the danger it
poses:
Think of the risk-of-physical-injury inquiry from the perspective of a defi-
nition of escape that picks up all departures from custody on the one hand
and a definition that picks up just walkaway offenses on the other. The
former category will contain a higher risk of physical injury and therefore
seem more like the prototypical crime of violence than the latter category
by itself. If we include walkaway escapes in the general category, they
likely will be treated as crimes of violence; if not, they likely will not be.
In this respect, the level of generality is destiny, requiring us to be careful
that the lines we draw are meaningful ones.162
Because the functional method permits courts to fashion categories without
direction from the statutory text, these courts can create conduct-based dis-
tinctions that lack significant differences in degree of risk posed and that
stifle uniform application. Such artificial distinctions are exactly what the
categorical approach rejects.
V. THE RULE-BASED NATURE OF THE FORMAL METHOD IS MORE FAITHFUL
TO APPRENDI V NEW JERSEY AND THE RULE OF LENITY AND GIVES
CONGRESS A STRONG INCENTIVE TO REVISE THE ACCA
The debate over whether to use the formal or functional method to di-
vide a statute and employ the modified categorical approach is an example
of the familiar distinction between "rules" and "standards.'' 63 The formal
method is a rule-based system because the sentencing outcome is deter-
mined by the existence of an objective factor: whether the statute's text
includes both violent and nonviolent ways of committing the crime. The
sentencing court has little discretion to make value judgments. By contrast,
the functional method is a standard-based system because it varies more by
the individual case. This Part argues that a rule-based ACCA regime is best
for the following reasons.
A. The Functional Method Is Inconsistent with Apprendi v. New Jersey
Because functional-method courts will divide statutes and employ the
modified categorical approach more often than formal-method courts, the
functional method presents a more significant Apprendi concern than the
formal method. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that,
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."'" Leaving such a determination
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1685, 1687-88 (1976).
164. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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to a judge is unconstitutional. 165 Taylor was decided a decade before Ap-
prendi and Jones, but the Court prefigured the role that the Sixth
Amendment would play in ongoing ACCA jurisprudence. The Taylor Court
recognized that a sentencing judge who applies a factual, noncategorical
method of interpreting a divisible statute might violate the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. 166 The jury, the Court reasoned, might re-
turn a verdict on a theory that would not qualify the defendant's conduct as
an ACCA predicate. Yet the sentencing judge in a future case, upon review-
ing the full facts, might classify the past conviction as the exact opposite-a
"violent felony."'167 As the Court later reiterated in Shepard, this ex post de-
termination by a judge is constitutionally invalid, because "the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a jury standing between a defendant and
the power of the State, and they guarantee a jury's finding of any disputed
fact essential to increase the ceiling of a potential sentence."' 68
The functional method treads very closely to exactly such a violation. As
discussed above, a defendant can usually parse a statute very closely to
identify a way of violating the statute in a nonviolent manner.169 If a func-
tional-method court accepts such a division, it will apply the modified
categorical approach and view the appropriate documents. At that point, the
same problems arise once again. Given inconclusive or conflicting facts and
only a general verdict of guilty, a court will be faced with a choice of either
not applying the ACCA predicate or facing an Apprendi violation.
70
165. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
166. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990). The permitted overinclu-
siveness of the categorical approach does not make it vulnerable to Apprendi problems. When
the categorical approach is properly applied, whether a prior conviction is a violent felony is a
legal question, in which the judge considers only the elements of the law and not the facts.
This consideration does not implicate the Sixth Amendment. It is only when the judge consid-
ers aspects of the crime not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant that the Sixth
Amendment comes into play. See Holman, supra note 45, at 218 n.49.
167. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601.
168. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 25 (2005) (emphasis added). In Shepard,
the government argued that an expanded factual inquiry could be conducted consistently with
Apprendi because a sentencing judge was, after all, dealing with a prior conviction, Brief for
the United States at 43-44, Shepard, 544 U.S. 13 (No. 03-9168), and the Supreme Court had
specifically excluded prior convictions from vulnerability to Sixth Amendment issues in Ap-
prendi, 530 U.S. at 490, and in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998)
(holding that recidivism is a sentencing factor, rather than an element of the offense that must
be proved to a jury). But the Shepard Court rejected that argument, noting that categorizing a
prior conviction for ACCA purposes is "too far removed from the conclusive significance of a
prior judicial record, and too much like the findings subject to Jones and Apprendi, to say that
Almendarez-Torres clearly authorizes a judge to resolve the dispute." Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25.
169. See supra Section III.B. For examples of creative parsing with respect to the
ACCA's "serious drug offense" provision, see Russell, supra note 32, at 1203-06.
170. On the related issue of the Ex Post Facto Clause, courts have held that as long as
the crime leading to the application of the enhancement is committed after the ACCA's pas-
sage, the enhancement will be viewed as a stiffened penalty for the post-passage crime, rather
than a retroactive punishment for any pre-ACCA convictions. See, e.g., United States v.
Springfield, 337 F.3d 1175, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732
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Imagine a hypothetical escape statute that is not formally divisible but is
functionally divisible. It simply says, "It is a crime to flee from police cus-
tody." A court applying the formal method would have to consider the risk
posed by all methods of fleeing, because the statute's text does not allow it
to divide the statute. But a functional-method court could divide the statute
however it saw fit. One way of doing so would be to say that simply walking
away from a police officer after being ordered to stop does not count as an
ACCA predicate, but assaulting a police officer after doing so does count as
a predicate. Both of these actions, though, are fleeing from custody and are
therefore sufficient to violate the statute itself.
Now imagine that the jury hears evidence indicating that, at first, the de-
fendant allegedly walked away, but after some time had passed, the
defendant assaulted an officer. The jury then returns a general guilty verdict.
The ACCA sentencing court now has a problem. It does not know on which
theory the jury convicted; either one is sufficient for conviction, but only
one counts as a predicate. If a judge counts such a conviction as an ACCA
predicate, the conviction is no longer tied to facts necessarily found by a
jury, because the jury may have convicted the defendant based on conduct
that does not constitute a predicate offense. This is exactly the problem the
Court envisioned in Taylor and found unconstitutional in Apprendi." A
judge applying the formal method, however, would not arrive at this prob-
lematic point, because he or she would have to consider the risk of physical
injury posed by all fleeing, without the information contained in the Shep-
ard documents. If nothing else, the formal method has the virtues of
simplicity and ease of application, avoiding the subtle and complex dilemma
posed by dividing a statute and wading into a beguiling evidentiary record.
B. The Formal Method Is More Consistent with the Rule of Lenity
"The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in
favor of the defendants subjected to them." 172 The rule "places the weight of
(1948) (holding that a habitual offender sentence is not "a new jeopardy or additional penalty
for earlier crimes," but rather "a stiffened penalty for the latest crime")); see also Jill C. Ra-
faloff, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement Statute or New
Offense?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1091-98 (1988) (concluding that the ACCA's language
and legislative history indicate Congress's intent that it be considered a sentencing enhance-
ment statute rather than a separate federal crime).
171. One might respond that any application of the modified categorical approach
violates the Sixth Amendment, because, no matter how the court arrives there, the court is still
viewing facts that may not have been found by a jury. But the Apprendi problem would only
arise where the defendant was alleged to have violated both the ACCA-qualifying and the non-
ACCA-qualifying portion of the statute, and the jury returned a general guilty verdict. If the
judge were to view the documents and sees that the defendant was convicted of violating only
the qualifying part of the statute, the judge could then conclude that the jury necessarily con-
victed the defendant of the qualifying part of the statute. The judge could therefore count the
conviction as a predicate without violating the Sixth Amendment.
172. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality opinion). Because
this argument attempts to give defendants the benefit of the ambiguity present in the ACCA, a
sentencing enhancement statute, as opposed to the elements of the predicate crimes, it might be
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inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to speak more clear-
ly"'73 and prevents courts from having to "play the part of a mindreader."' 74
The ACCA's vagueness makes it a particularly strong rule-of-lenity candi-
date, 175 and at least one member of the Court has acknowledged as much in
the past.1 76 Years of imprisonment hinge on the sentencing court's interpreta-
tion of the ACCA's residual clause, yet there has been no consistent,
uniformly applied articulation of its meaning. The frequency with which the
Court has attempted to resolve circuit splits by taking ACCA cases in recent
years demonstrates the vagueness of the statute. 7 7 The rule of lenity favors
resolving this vagueness with a more underinclusive method of categorizing
prior convictions.
Rule-based systems are both overinclusive and underinclusive, because
they do not tie their outcomes to real-world conduct or the relevant values at
stake, but rather to the presence or absence of an objective factor or set of
factors.78 This is true of the formal method, a rule-based system in which
the sentencing outcome depends on whether the statute's text makes the
statute divisible. There is reason to believe, however, that the formal method
will be more likely than the functional method to avoid overinclusiveness,
consistent with the values embodied in the rule of lenity.
Most formally indivisible statutes will not amount to ACCA predicates.
Because the statute's text makes it indivisible, the court will, of course, not
said that this argument is based not on the rule of lenity, but rather lenity itself. Whatever its
name, the justification for construing the ACCA in favor of defendants is identical to that for the
underlying crimes: "the fundamental principle that no citizen should be held accountable for a
violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not
clearly prescribed." Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 515.
175. For an explanation of the traditional due process and separation of powers foun-
dations of the rule of lenity in the ACCA context, see The Supreme Court, 2006 Term-
Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 345, 350-52 (2007) (arguing that applying the rule of
lenity when interpreting the ACCA's residual clause is consistent with "the due process notion
that only clearly stated laws can justify significant deprivations of liberty" and "prevents legis-
latures from punting their crime-defining function to the courts").
176. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 153 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (apply-
ing the rule of lenity because it was unclear if drunk driving posed at least as serious of a risk
of physical injury as burglary); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 219 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("The rule of lenity ... demands that we give this text the more narrow reading of
which it is susceptible.").
177. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2287 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("What sets ACCA apart from [other vague] statutes-and what confirms its incurable vague-
ness-is our repeated inability to craft a principled test out of the statutory text."). In his
separate opinion in Chambers, Justice Alito identified circuit splits over whether the following
crimes count as ACCA predicates: rape, retaliation against a government officer, attempting or
conspiring to commit burglary (even after James), carrying a concealed weapon, and fleeing
from the police in a motor vehicle (resolved by Sykes). Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S.
122, 133 n.2 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring). There have doubtless been more splits since
Chambers.
178. Michael M. O'Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74
U. CIN. L. REV. 749,755 (2006).
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divide it, even though the defendant could have violated that statute in a way
that would amount to a crime of violence. The court will then consider the
conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense and ask if that conduct
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.17 9 Given the Court's
analysis in James, almost all ways of violating a statute would have to
qualify as a crime of violence in order for the defendant's conviction to be
classified as an ACCA predicate under a formally indivisible statute. 180 As
noted above, such a threshold could lead to either over- or under-
inclusiveness, but given that ACCA categorization problems arise in the
context of-and indeed, are caused by-broadly written statutes, it is un-
likely that all or almost all ways of violating such a broad, inclusive statute
would be violent. Because the formal method would not treat convictions
under these statutes as ACCA predicates, the result is likely to avoid overin-
clusiveness and is therefore more lenient to criminal defendants.
181
Not so for the functional method, which would proceed to divide the
broad, formally indivisible statutes that a formal-method court would con-
sider in the abstract. By consulting the additional documents, functional
method courts would, given a sufficient record, categorize defendants' past
convictions accordingly. Many-perhaps most-of the convictions under
these formally indivisible statutes may amount to conduct which qualifies as
a violent crime. The functional method is thus harsher on criminal defend-
ants, lumping in more convictions than the self-imposed abstraction of the
formal method would tolerate.
Of course, by "skimming the surface" and applying the categorical ap-
proach (rather than dividing the statute), the formal method presents the risk
179. For more detail on the application of the categorical approach, see supra Section
II.A.
180. See James, 550 U.S. at 208 (stating that the categorical approach does not require
"every conceivable factual offense covered by a statute [to] necessarily present a serious po-
tential risk of injury before the offense can be deemed a violent felony," but the "ordinary
case" must present such a risk); United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2009)
("[A] crime must be categorized as one of violence even if, through some freak chance, the
conduct did not turn out to be violent in an unusual case.").
It should also be noted that the permitted overinclusiveness of the categorical approach is
in tension with the Court's conclusion in Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193
(2007), that the defendant must point to actual cases in order to show that the state statute has
been applied to conduct which would not qualify under a listed crime in a federal statute. See
supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. Presumably, if the defendant did identify such a
case, the sentencing court would be allowed to simply deem the case a "freak chance" and
proceed to categorize the statute as violent. The Supreme Court has not addressed this tension.
181. Here, one might respond that the functional method is harsher where appropriate.
By dividing the statute and examining the defendant's conduct, the functional method "gets it
right" by punishing only those who actually commit "crimes of violence." For this reason, it
might also be said that the functional method leads to more even treatment of defendants. But
this argument would justify looking at the defendant's conduct in every case, an approach the
Supreme Court has rejected without exception. See supra Section II.A. And while it is an
empirical question for which there is no available data, any unevenness created by the formal
method is likely to cut in favor of defendants because, compared to the functional method, it
leads to more categorical consideration of prior convictions.
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of unfair under- or overinclusiveness contained within the categorical ap-
proach itself. The approach may be underinclusive in that a defendant may
violate a categorically nonviolent statute in a violent way. 82 The approach
may also be overinclusive in that the defendant may be convicted of vio-
lating a prototypically violent crime, when, in the defendant's particular
case, the defendant's conduct did not actually present a risk of injury.
83
There is no empirical evidence available, but logically there should be
more instances of defendants violently running afoul of broadly written,
categorically nonviolent statutes than instances in which, "through some
freak chance," a defendant violates a categorically-violent-crime statute
even though his conduct was not violent.184
For example, compare the drunk-driving statute at issue in Begay v.
United States, which the Supreme Court concluded did not cover categori-
cally violent crime, 85 with Oklahoma's statute criminalizing assault and
battery against a law enforcement officer, which the Tenth Circuit catego-
rized as violent in United States v. Kutz.186 It is easy to conceive of conduct
that would violate the categorically nonviolent drunk driving statute in a
violent way. Yet it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which a defendant
could violate the categorically violent assault-and-battery statute in a nonvi-
olent way. Not all cases are clear-cut, but the general point remains that the
categorical approach is, if anything, likely to avoid overinclusiveness. And
because it stays hinged to the categorical approach, the formal method is
more likely to avoid overinclusiveness than the functional method.
The formal method's avoidance of overinclusiveness is more consistent
with the rule of lenity. The formal method rightly gives criminal defendants
the benefit of statutory vagueness by considering the convictions under a
formally indivisible statute in the abstract. The functional method, however,
uses the modified categorical approach to bypass the statute's vagueness,
182. See Holman, supra note 45, at 213 (describing, as an example of this underinclu-
siveness, a defendant who violates a statute prohibiting tampering with witnesses by
physically harming the witness in order to prevent the witness from testifying).
183. United States v. Thomas, 361 F.3d 653, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 2004), vacated, 543
U.S. 1111 (2005) (describing, as an example of this overinclusiveness, a defendant who is
convicted of attempted murder for trying to shoot someone when the gun, unbeknownst to the
defendant, had no bullets in it).
184. See Woods, 576 F.3d at 404 (characterizing overinclusion as a "freak chance").
185. 553 U.S. 137, 144-48 (2008). The statute provided that it is unlawful for "a per-
son to drive a vehicle in this state if the person has an alcohol concentration of eight one
hundredths or more in the person's blood or breath within three hours of driving the vehicle
and the alcohol concentration results from alcohol consumed before or while driving the vehi-
cle." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(C)(1) (Supp. 2011).
186. 439 F. App'x 751,753 (10th Cir. 2011). The statute reads as follows:
Every person who, without justifiable or excusable cause knowingly commits battery
or assault and battery upon the person of a police officer, sheriff, deputy sheriff...
while said officer is in the performance of his duties, upon conviction, shall be guilty
of a felony ....
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 649(B) (2011).
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and if it finds that the defendant's prior conviction is a "crime of violence,"
it resolves the ACCA's vagueness at the defendant's expense. Until congress
heeds the judiciary's call and amends the ACCA, 187 the formal method best
guarantees that criminal defendants do not bear the burden of poor congres-
sional drafting.
C. A Rule-Based Approach Provides the Strongest Incentive
to Congress to Rewrite the ACCA
The formal method stands a better chance of motivating Congress to re-
write the ACCA itself.' 8 Rules provide for greater clarity'89 and
consistency 90 of decisionmaking. This clarity and consistency results in a
more intelligible body of judicial decisions, which gives public officials
greater guidance when they evaluate the statute in the future. 191 In other
words, if courts use the formal method, Congress will know that courts will
only divide a statute if its text contains multiple categories of behavior, only
some of which constitute predicate convictions. If Congress is unsatisfied
with the number or type of crimes courts include as predicates under that
187. Two Supreme Court justices have called for revision of the statute. See Chambers
v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 134 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) ("At this point, the only
tenable, long-term solution is for Congress to formulate a specific list of expressly defined
crimes that are deemed to be worthy of ACCA's sentencing enhancement."); James v. United
States, 550 U.S. 192, 230 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court could "rec-
ognize the statute for the drafting failure it is and hold it void for vagueness").
188. Neither the formal nor functional method may provide states any incentive at all
to rewrite their statutes. In 2008, courts applied only 653 ACCA sentencing enhancements.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTics 47
tbl.22 (2008). Assuming an equal distribution of ACCA enhancements across states, this
amounts to approximately thirteen ACCA enhancements per state, per year. It is unlikely that
such a small number of cases would command the significant effort needed to rewrite a state
criminal statute, much less a group of statutes.
189. See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Youth Crime and the Choice between Rules and Stand-
ards, 1991 BYU. L. REV. 351, 358 (1991) ("A further reflection of the importance of rules to
the criminal justice system is that system's hostility to ambiguity and discretion.").
190. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 976 (1995)
("Here, too, rules have large virtues in a system that aspires to consistent decisions amidst
heterogeneity.").
191. See id. at 977; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175, 1186 (1989) (criticizing the lack of guidance to future decisionmakers when stand-
ards are used to resolve cases). To some degree, the formal method does leave federal courts at
the mercy of state legislatures, who write the criminal statutes that serve as the basis for predi-
cate convictions. Yet any arbitrariness resulting from the formal method is counterbalanced by
the judicial arbitrariness in the functional method. Because it more clearly defines the circum-
stances in which a judge can divide a statute, the formal method offers defendants greater
predictability. Combined with the benefits of fidelity to precedent and Congressional intent,
avoiding constitutional problems, and lenity, this predictability reduces the extent to which
this legislative arbitrariness is problematic.
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framework, it can revise the statute to suit its preferences.'92 But when judg-
es try to fix Congress's poor drafting through a series of standards and loose
decisions, a less concrete body of law emerges. 193 Thus, Congress has a
weaker incentive to fix the problem. That is the case with the functional
method. The lack of predictability and consistency of statutory divisions
makes the statute's flaws less comprehensible. A less clearly objectionable
body of law is less likely to get Congress's attention, and the Supreme Court
will continue to issue piecemeal ACCA decisions, as it has for the last five
years. If the goal is to convince Congress to rewrite the ACCA, 194 the formal
method is best.
CONCLUSION
Sentencing courts that seek to determine whether a prior conviction may
be counted as a predicate offense under the ACCA's residual clause should
resort to the modified categorical approach only when the state criminal
statute textually identifies multiple categories of behavior, only some of
which constitute a crime of violence. This formal, rule-based method is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's ACCA jurisprudence, as well as the rule of
lenity, and is less likely to implicate the Sixth Amendment concerns raised
by recidivist sentencing enhancements in the past. Because it is more com-
prehensible to outsiders, such an approach may also prompt Congress, if it
disagrees, to redraft the ACCA, a statute whose application has been marked
by imprecision and unpredictability. Until that time, however, courts seeking
a ready solution to divisibility problems in ACCA predicate analysis will
find it in the formal method.
192. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2288 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that if the ACCA were limited only to the enumerated crimes, Congress could respond
by "quickly addling] what it wishe[d]").
193. Scalia, supra note 191, at 1186. For a response to the argument that poor drafting
makes a standard more preferable, see id. at 1183 ("Such reduction of vague congressional
commands into rules that are less than a perfect fit is not a frustration of legislative intent
because that is what courts have traditionally done, and hence what Congress anticipates when
it legislates.").
194. This does appear to be the goal of several Justices. See supra notes 8-9 and
accompanying text.
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